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ABSTRACT 
This chapter presents the concept of Smart Home, describes the Smart Home networking technologies 
and discusses the main issues for ensuring security in a Smart Home environment. Nowadays, the 
integration of current communication and information technologies within the dwelling has led to the 
emergence of Smart Homes. These technologies facilitate the building of Smart Home environments in 
which devices and systems can communicate with each other and can be controlled automatically in 
order to interact with the household members and improve the quality of their life. However, the nature 
of Smart Home environment, the fact that it is always connected to the outside world via Internet and 
the open security back doors derived from the household members raise many security concerns. 
Finally, by reviewing the existing literature regarding Smart Homes and security issues that exist in 
Smart Home environments, the authors envisage to provide a base to broaden the research in Smart 
Home security. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades the Smart Home 
development is a continuously evolving field 
that faces exceptional challenges. However, the 
recent advances in information and 
communications technologies have led the 
Smart Home development  
in a good level of maturity. A Smart Home is a 
living environment that incorporates the 
appropriate technology, called Smart Home 
technology, to meet the resident goals of comfort 
living, life safety, security and efficiency 
(Ricquebourg et al., 2006; Pohl & Sikora, 2005; 
Jiang, Liu, & Yang, 2004; Friedewald, Da Costa, 
Punie, Alahuhta, & Heinonen, 2005). 
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Smart home technology achieves these 
goals building an environment which 
consists of a variety of home systems. A 
Smart Home encompasses four types of 
Smart Home systems; Home Appliances, 
Lighting and Climate Control system, 
Home Entertainment system, Home 
Communication system and Home Security 
System (Pohl & Sikora, 2005; Valtchev, 
Frankov, & ProSyst Software AG, 2002). 
Each of the above systems is characterized 
by different requirements (e.g. data rate, 
distance) based on the applications that 
supports. Thus, different physical media are 
appropriate for different Smart Home 
systems. In a Smart Home, the physical 
media that can be used by the Smart Home 
systems are the following: the existing 
wiring, a new wiring and the air. The 
existing wiring refers to the existing 
electrical wiring, the existing telephone 
wiring and the existing coax cabling. A new 
wiring requires installation of new cabling 
in the walls and the air refers to wireless 
networking (Pohl & Sikora, 2005; Jiang et 
al., 2004; Valtchev et al., 2002; Adams, 
2002; Zahariadis, 2003). 
In spite the fact that there is a high level 
of complexity and heterogeneity because of 
the various communication media and 
network protocols, the Smart Home 
systems are integrated into a well structured 
network, called Smart Home internal 
network. This integration is achieved using 
a central node, called residential gateway 
(RG), which serves as a bridge between the 
internal network of the Smart Home 
environment and the Internet. The 
residential gateway represents the 
intelligent control of a Smart Home as it 
manages the systems and connects them to 
the outside Internet world (Pohl & Sikora, 
2005; Valtchev et al., 2002; Adams, 2002; 
HGI, 2006). 
However, the heterogeneous and 
dynamic nature of the Smart Home internal 
network, the fact that it is always connected 
to the Internet and the fact that the 
household members usually open security 
back doors unintentionally are factors that 
create many security challenges in a Smart 
Home environment. For that reasons, 
security is a critical issue in Smart Home 
environment. The principal idea behind 
secure Smart Home is to preserve occupant 
privacy (improper eavesdropping or 
tampering of information) and not to allow 
service interference (e.g. blocking home 
network services) (Jeong, Chung, & Choo, 
2006; Herzog et al., 2001; Thomas & 
Sandhu, 2004; Wang, Yang, & Yurcik, 
2005; Schwiderski-Grosche, Tomlinson, 
Goo, & Irvine, 2004; He, 2002). 
The notion of providing security in Smart Home 
environments relies on the maintenance of six 
essential properties; Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authentication, Authorization, Non-repudiation and 
Availability. Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authorization, Non-repudiation and Availability 
play very important roles in ensuring of Smart Home 
internal network security. However, Authentication 
can be considered as the first step in the pyramid of 
a security mechanism (Jeong, et al., 2006; 
Komninos, Vergados, & Douligeris, 2007a; Thomas 
& Sandhu, 2004; Schwiderski-Grosche et al., 2004; 
He, 2002; Bergstrom, Driscoll, & Kimball, 2001). 
Following the introduction, this chapter is 
organized as follows. Firstly, in the second section, 
the concept of the Smart Home and its main 
components are presented. Furthermore, an 
overview of the main Smart Home systems is given 
and the role of the residential gateway in the Smart 
Home environment is discussed. The third section is 
devoted to the current Smart Home networking 
technology. In the fourth section, the security 
requirements that should be satisfied in a Smart 
Home are described. The fifth section concentrates 
on the factors that affect the security in a Smart 
Home environment. In the sixth section, security 
threats for the Smart Home internal network are 
discussed. In the seventh section, existing security 
technologies that provide security features in Smart 
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Homes are described. Finally, the eighth section 
concludes the chapter. 
SMART HOME CONCEPT 
It is very important to determine the main 
components of the Smart Home architectural 
model in order to be able to understand the 
factors that raise security breaches in a Smart 
Home environment as well as realize security 
technologies that can be applied to minimize 
the risk of security attacks. Smart Home can be 
considered that consists of three main 
components; the internal network, the external 
network and the residential gateway. These 
three components are presented in the Figure 1. 
The internal network is the basis of a Smart 
Home and can consist of wired and wireless 
networks. The internal network of a Smart 
Home incorporates a combination of different 
communication media and protocols in order to 
support a number of Smart Home systems that 
simplify the residents’ life and improve their 
quality of life. The external network of a Smart 
Home includes Internet and the service provider 
which is in charge to provide services over 
Internet to the household members. Finally, 
residential gateway (RG) is an always 
connected device located in a Smart Home and 
plays a very important role in bridging the 
internal network of the Smart Home and the 
outside world (Ricquebourg et al., 2006; Pohl 
& Sikora, 2005; Valtchev et al., 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 
2003). 
Smart Home Systems 
The Smart Home internal network can integrate 
a variety of Smart Home systems, which provide 
a convenient and safe environment to the 
household members, as well as help them to 
perform their household tasks effectively. Smart 
Home systems can be classified into four 
categories (Figure 2): Home Appliances, 
Lighting and Climate Control system, Home 
Entertainment System, Home Communication 
System and Home Security System (Pohl & 
Sikora, 2005; Valtchev et al., 2002; Friedewald 
et al., 2005; Zahariadis, 2003; Delphinanto, 
2003). 
Figure 1. Smart home concept 
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Home Appliances, Lighting and Climate 
Control System 
Home Appliances, Lighting and Climate Control 
system consists of three subsystems. The Home 
Appliances Control subsystem monitors and 
controls the power outlets in Smart Home. Thus, 
based on this subsystem, the habitat is able to 
monitor the power consumption as well as switch 
off power outlets separately. Furthermore, the 
Home Appliances Control subsystem can include 
smart appliances that communicate with each 
other and the outside Internet world making 
habitat’s daily life more comfortable and 
enjoyable. The Lighting Control subsystem 
consists of switches, lights and sensors. This 
subsystem monitors the intensity of light as well 
as the activities of the occupants in a smart 
domestic environment. Based on these factors 
the Lighting Control subsystem adapts lighting 
of intelligent inhouse ambient. Finally, the 
Climate Control subsystem includes the 
functions of heating, ventilating, and air-
conditioning. This subsystem monitors and 
controls temperature and humidity in a Smart 
Home environment providing healthy conditions 
within. Additionally, Lighting and Climate 
Control subsystem reduces costs for heating, 
cooling and lighting by smart energy 
management helping the homeowner to save 
money (Pohl & Sikora, 2005; Valtchev et al., 




Home Entertainment system provides the connection 
and communication of audio and video appliances 
over broadband networks serving distribution of 
high fidelity audio signal and high quality digital 
video. An Entertainment system can be consisted of 
a home theater, projection systems, plasma or LCD 
screens, a multi-channel surround sound system, 
satellite and digital television channels, video on 
demand systems, gaming consoles, a central media 
server, a central control system as well as a multi 
room audio video system for full audio and visual 
distribution. Digital audio is distributed from MP3 
files, Internet radio and the home media server 
throughout the system to every room in the Smart 
Home. Furthermore, digital video content is 
distributed from the broadband connection, DVDs, 
PCs and the home media server to any video screen 
in the smart environment (Pohl & Sikora, 2005; 
Teger, Waks, & System Dynamics Inc., 2002; 
Valtchev et al., 2002; Han, Park, Jeong, & Park, 
Figure 2. Smart home systems 
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2006; Friedewald et al., 2005; Zahariadis, 2003; 
Delphinanto, 2003). 
Home Communication System 
Home Communication system provides 
telephone services such as conventional voice 
services and video conferencing calls as well as 
incorporates the intercommunication system of 
an intelligent inhouse environment for calling 
from room to room. Furthermore, this system 
contains devices such as PCs, printers, 
scanners, mobile phones, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) and enables them to 
communicate with each other, to share 
information and a broadband connection within 
the Smart Home. Thus, tenants are able to chat, 
send emails and share data (e.g. digital photos, 
video) with other people in any place in the 
world. Finally, this system supports 
telecommuting for the residents (Pohl & 
Sikora, 2005; Teger et al., 2002; Valtchev et al., 
2002; Han et al., 2006; Friedewald et al., 2005; 
Zahariadis, 2003; Delphinanto, 2003). 
Home Security System 
Home Security system encompasses 
identification mechanisms such as biometric 
recognition, voice recognition and face 
recognition, RFID tokens and smart cards that 
provide access control. Moreover, this system 
includes notification mechanisms such as 
burglar alarms that allow immediate reaction. 
Also, surveillance mechanisms such as CCTV 
can be part of Home Security system for 
monitoring in a Smart Home. What is more, 
there are solutions such as vibration shock 
sensors, glassbreak sensors, for the detection of 
an intruder to a habitat. Furthermore, there are 
systems which use lights that automatically 
switch on and off giving the impression that 
someone is at home. Additionally, Home 
Security System comprises electro-mechanical 
door locks, electric windows and door shutters. 
Finally, health and well-being monitoring for 
disabled and elderly people as well as children 
can be part of this system (Pohl & Sikora, 2005; 
Teger et al., 2002; Valtchev et al., 2002; Han et 
al., 2006; Friedewald et al., 2005; Zahariadis, 
2003; Delphinanto, 2003). 
Residential Gateway 
In a Smart Home, the residential gateway is a 
network device which integrates all the different 
networking technologies that exist in the Smart 
Home internal network as well as provides 
access from the internal network to Internet and 
vice versa. The residential gateway serves as a 
single point of internal network convergence and 
distribution of both LAN-initiated and 
WANinitiated services. The residential gateway 
enables switching, routing and inter-working 
functions between the devices of the Smart 
Home systems over the internal network. This 
network device also supports high level 
distribution of advanced multimedia services 
over Internet broadband connectivity. 
Furthermore, the residential gateway supports 
remote control of the Smart Home systems and 
home appliances (Ricquebourg et al., 2006; Pohl 
& Sikora, 2005; Valtchev et al., 2002; Adams, 
2002; Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006). 
Due to the variety of access network 
technologies, the residential gateway is able to 
interface with the majority of wired or wireless 
broadband access networks (e.g. ADSL, 
broadband mobile phone network, satellite link 
etc.). Different WAN side interfaces types can be 
provided by a residential gateway, but only one 
interface is supported at a time. Additionally, the 
residential gateway is able to support 
wired/wireless LAN interfaces towards the 
internal network since there are a lot of wired 
(HomePlug, HomePNA, Ethernet, IEEE 1394 
and USB) and wireless (IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, 
Zigbee and HiperLAN) networking technologies 
in a Smart Home. Moreover, the residential 
gateway provides QoS management to support 
services of different types at the same time. 
Besides, the residential gateway contains the 
rules for classification, queuing and priority field 
mappings (Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006). 
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Furthermore, a residential gateway enables 
functionalities related to security of the Smart 
Home environment. It provides protection for the 
household members from unauthorized attacks 
and intrusions. Thus, a residential gateway 
encompasses a variety of security features such 
as firewalls, authentication mechanisms, 
authorization mechanisms and intrusion 
detection mechanisms (Kim, Lee, Han, & Kim, 




Smart Home internal network is based on 
various communication media and 
protocols (Figure 3). It is a combination of 
wired and wireless networks, since various 
transmission mediums, such as telephone 
lines, power lines, radio communication 
and wired cables are used in order to 
transmit signal throughout the Smart Home 
environment (Ricquebourg et al., 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2004; Teger et al., 2002; 
Valtchev et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; 
HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 2003). Thus, the 
security threats in the internal network 
include those derived from both wired 
networks and wireless networks. 
Smart Home networks can be organized 
into three categories: existing wired 
networks, new Figure 3. Smart home 
networking technologies wired networks 
and wireless networks (Figure 3). Existing 
wired networks reuse the existing inhome 
wiring, which consists of electrical wiring, 
telephone wiring and coaxial cabling, to 
transfer data. New wired networks require 
special cabling to distribute high-speed data 
and video throughout the dwelling. Finally, 
wireless networks use the air as 
transmission medium and offer solutions 
with “no wires” requirements (Teger et al., 
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2002; Valtchev et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 
2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 2003). 
Wired networks provide more security compared 
to wireless networks, since they cannot be as easily 
tapped. It is easy for an adversary to intercept the 
signal or to disturb the normal operation of a wireless 
network, because of the fact that wireless 
technologies cannot control the transmission range. 
Furthermore, the dynamism and mobility provided 
by wireless networks yield more chances for 
adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities of the network 
invisibly (Schwiderski-Grosche et al., 2004; 
Komninos, Vergados, & Douligeris, 2007c; 
Krishnamurthy, Kabara, & Anusas-amornkul, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006). 
Existing Wired Networks 
Existing wired network technology is directly 
applicable to new and old houses as rewiring of 
the buildings is not required. The major 
limitations of this networking technology 
include the networks’ structure and the 
interference from the original operation of the 
network. Based on existing wiring of a home, 
Powerline networks, Phoneline networks as 
well as Coaxial networks can be developed to 
satisfy the needs of the household members 
(Jiang et al., 2004; Teger et al., 2002; Valtchev 
et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006; 
Delphinanto, 2003). 
Powerline Networks 
Powerline networking makes use of the existing 
electrical wiring, which is already used to 
provide power to home appliances and lights. 
The main target of Powerline networking is to 
connect devices to each other and to Internet 
plugging them directly into AC wall outlets in 
a Smart Home. However, based on the current 
Powerline technologies, we need to add an 
adapter to each device before it is plugged into 
an outlet. Currently Powerline networks 
support low speed connections (50 Kbps to 350 
Kbps) because of the small bandwidth capacity 
of the wire. Thus, in a Smart Home Powerline 
networking can be used in Home Appliances, 
Lighting and Climate Control system as well as 
Home Security system for applications with 
low data rate requirements. Furthermore, new 
modulation techniques and technologies have 
increased the data rate of Powerline networks 
enabling them to support multimedia 
applications such as audio and video streaming 
in a Smart Home (Paruchuri, Durresi, & 
Ramesh, 2008). However, there is possibility 
that the transmitted signal over the power line 
network leaks out of the Smart Home 
environment through the leaked 
electromagnetic wave from the electric power 
line. Thus, blocking filters which block off the 
high frequency ingredient of the signal should 
be installed in the power line communication 
network (Nishi, Morioka, & Sakurai, 2005). 
The main communication protocols for 
Powerline networks are HomePlug, X10, 
BatiBus, CEBus, LonWorks, and EHS (Jiang et 
al., 2004; Teger et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; 
HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 2003). 
HomePlug is the major standard for 
Powerline communication. It is a simple-to-use, 
Ethernetclass standard and is created by the 
HomePlug Powerline Alliance. There are four 
versions of HomePlug standard. The first 
version, HomePlug 1.0, supports connections 
with data rate at 14Mbps. The second version, 
HomePlug 1.0 Turbo, runs at 85Mbps. The third 
version, HomePlug AV designed for HDTV and 
VoIP applications runs at 189Mbps. Finally, the 
last version, HomePlug Command and Control, 
operates at low data rate and is suitable for 
applications of Home Appliances, Lighting and 
Climate Control system (Adams, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 
2003). 
Furthermore, HomePlug AV protocol forms 
virtual private LANs using cryptographic 
isolation. When a virtual private network is 
formed, a Network Membership Key (NMK) is 
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distributed to all station of this network. The 
distribution of the NMK to all stations may take 
place with three ways. In the first way, NMK can 
be provided to each station by he host directly. In 
the second way, it can be distributed using the 
Device Access Key (DAK). In the third way, it 
can be passed using the Unicast Key Exchange 
protocol. 
The possession of the NMK defines each 
station in the network. Furthermore, another key, 
called Network Encryption Key (NEK), is used 
in this network. This key is changed periodically 
for security reasons. The controller of the 
network distributes the NEK, which is encrypted 
using the NMK, to all stations. The encryption 
which is applied is 128-bit AES to ensure that the 
data streams cannot be eavesdropped. Each 
station uses the NEK to encrypt the payloads of 
the data that sends in the network (Paruchuri et 
al., 2008). 
Phoneline Networks 
Phoneline networking provides an easy and 
inexpensive way to connect devices for 
sharing data, peripherals and a high-speed 
Internet access throughout a Smart Home 
using the registered phone jacks and the 
existing in-home telephone cabling without 
affecting the telephone service. Phoneline 
networking requires the installation of a 
network adapter, which supports the 
phone-line protocols, to each device that 
the user wants to connect to the Phoneline 
network. Then, the user connects the 
network adapter of the device to the 
telephone outlet with a standard telephone 
cable. In contrast to Powerline networks 
and coaxial networks which require 
physical isolation or data encryption to 
prevent eavesdropping, Phoneline 
networks do not use any method for 
ensuring security as they are not shared 
(Björklund, 2007). 
HomePNA is the main industry standard 
for Phoneline networking and provides an 
additional communication channel over the 
existing telephone line (Jiang et al., 2004; 
Teger et al., 2002; Valtchev et al., 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003). HomePNA is an 
Ethernet-based standard and is developed 
by the Home Phoneline Networking 
Alliance. Recently, there are a lot of 
vendors that comply with this standard. 
There are three versions of HomePNA, the 
HomePNA 1.0 providing data rate at 
1Mbps, the HomePNA 2.0 running at 
10Mbps and the HomePNA 3.0 operating 
at 100 Mbps. Therefore, Phoneline 
networks can handle applications of Home 
Communication system and Entertainment 
system that include applications with high 
data rate requirements (Adams, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 
2003). 
Coaxial Networks 
Coaxial networking makes use of coaxial 
cabling which is normally used for 
distribution of radio and TV signal in a 
residence. Coaxial networks are 
characterized by large bandwidth 
capabilities and can support applications of 
Home Communication system and Home 
Entertainment system (Teger et al., 2002; 
Valtchev et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; 
HGI, 2006). The major standard for this 
technology is HomeCNA, which is 
developed by the Home Cable Network 
Alliance. However, Coaxial networking 
represents the minority of in-home 
networks for existing buildings because of 
small use of coaxial cabling (Adams, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; Delphinanto, 2003). In 
Coaxial networks, physical isolation as 
well as encryption are required to avoid 
eavesdropping on network traffic 
(Björklund, 2007). 
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New Wired Networks 
New wired networks or structured wiring networks 
provide high performance connectivity and high 
reliability. Thus, this type of in-home networks can 
support applications of Home Communication 
system, Home Entertainment system and Home 
Security system. The main disadvantage of new 
wired networks is that they can not be installed or 
extended easily in an existing home or apartment 
because of their wiring requirements. Running new 
data cables inside the walls of an existing brick or 
stone home is not an affordable solution. However, 
it is a good idea to run the wiring throughout the 
house while it is being built. The most common 
communication standards of new wired networking 
are Ethernet, IEEE 1394 and USB (Jiang et al., 2004; 
Valtchev et al., 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006). 
Ethernet or IEEE 802.3 is the most widespread 
wired-LAN standard for PCs and workstations. 
Ethernet is a mature technology characterized by 
simplicity in installation and configuration. This 
standard can support a plethora of services such as 
TCP/IP based data, voice and video applications in a 
Smart Home and is supported by a lot of vendors. In 
1985, the first version, Ethernet (10Base), was 
defined and run at a data rate of 10Mbps. After ten 
years, the second version, Fast Ethernet (100Base), 
was published and run at 100Mbps. The third 
version, Gigabit Ethernet (10000Base), works at 
1Gbit/s. Finally, the last version, 10Gigabit Ethernet, 
operates at 10Gbit/s (Adams, 2002; Zahariadis, 
2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 2003). 
Ethernet has a number of vulnerabilities that 
affect the network security. The main weakness 
is the fact that all stations in a local network 
share the same physical channel. Thus, an 
attacker can easily eavesdrop on transmitted 
traffic as what a station sends over the network 
can be received simultaneously by all the other 
stations of the network. Furthermore, Ethernet 
standard does not provide any mechanism for 
verification of message sender’s identity or 
verification of message integrity. Therefore, an 
adversary can generate fraudulent data and 
insert them in the network traffic or he/she can 
obtains messages that are being exchanged 
between two legitimate communicating parties 
and retransmit them later as an authorized 
entity. These two weaknesses can be addressed 
dividing the Ethernet LAN in the Smart Home 
into sub-networks using bridges (Khoussainov 
& Patel, 2000). 
Wireless Networks 
Wireless networking is a very attractive 
solution for Smart Home networking providing 
simple installation, high flexibility and high 
data rate. Additionally, wireless networking 
does not include the cost of rewiring as well as 
the challenges of the existing wiring networks. 
What is more, wireless networks can be 
expanded easily in a home environment 
according to household members’ needs. 
Wireless networks are used to satisfy 
requirements for mobility, ad hoc networking, 
relocation as well as coverage of areas hard to 
wired local area networks. Consequently, there 
are many applications areas for wireless 
networks. However, wireless networks 
sometimes have line-of-sight requirements and 
limited coverage. They can be used in all types 
of Smart Home systems, from Home 
Appliances, Lighting and Climate Control 
system to Communication, Entertainment and 
Security systems. There are a lot of residential 
wireless networking standards but the most 
dominant are IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth (IEEE 
802.15.1), Zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4), and 
HiperLAN (Ricquebourg et al., 2006; Jiang et 
al., 2004; Teger et al., 2002; Valtchev et al., 
2002; Adams, 2002; Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 
2006; Delphinanto, 2003). 
IEEE 802.11 
IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards and is 
considered as the most widespread standard for 
wireless local area networks worldwide. In 1999, 
IEEE published 802.11a and 802.11b. IEEE 
802.11b is the slowest and least expensive 
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standard. In 2002, 802.11g was published to 
extend the IEEE 802.11b data rates to 54Mbps 
operating in the 2.4GHz band. Its range is around 
50 meters. Right now, 802.11g is the most 
popular flavor of 802.11 for in-home networks 
because of its speed and reliability. Finally, IEEE 
802.11n is the newest standard that is widely 
available and improves speed (140 Mbps) and 
range, but, it still in draft form (Adams, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 
2003). 
Security in IEEE 802.11 standards is provided 
using Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) and Wi-Fi Protected 
Access 2 (WPA2). WEP was the first security 
mechanism providing confidentiality, access 
control and data integrity in wireless 
communication. WEP uses RC4 encryption 
algorithm to protect the transmitted data. 
However, WEP is the most unsecured 
mechanism of these three, as it has a number of 
vulnerabilities. Transmitted packets can be easily 
captured and forged by attackers. Furthermore, 
WEP uses static keys which are rarely changed 
by users. WPA is a security mechanism created 
in response to the known serious weaknesses of 
WEP. WPA is a subset of the 802.11i standard. 
Similar to WEP, WPA uses RC4 as its encryption 
method. However, the strongest of these three 
security mechanisms is WPA2 which is based on 
the full 802.11i standard. This mechanism uses 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as 
encryption method and provides better security 
than WEP and WAP (Krishnamurthy et al., 2002; 
Björklund, 2007; Komninos & Mantas, 2009). 
Bluetooth 
Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) is an open 
standard specification that enables short-
range (10cm – 10m) wireless connections 
for a wide range of portable and/or fixed 
devices. The older Bluetooth 1.0 has a 
maximum data rate at 1 Mbps while the 
newest Bluetooth 2.0 can handle up to 
3Mbps. Bluetooth enabled devices 
communicate through short-range, ad hoc 
networks called piconets. Piconets are 
established dynamically and automatically 
as Bluetooth devices enter and leave radio 
proximity. Furthermore, Bluetooth 
technology supports both data and voice 
transmission simultaneously (Ricquebourg 
et al., 2006; Adams, 2002; Zahariadis, 
2003; HGI, 2006; Delphinanto, 2003). 
Bluetooth implements several 
authentication and data encryption 
mechanisms to provide security. The 
Bluetooth authentication scheme uses a 
challenge response method. The Bluetooth 
encryption scheme encrypts the payloads of 
the transmitted packets using a stream 
cipher E0. Furthermore, any pair of 
Bluetooth enabled devices that desire to 
communicate with each other should 
generate a session key, called link key, 
using a combination of an initialization key, 
the device MAC address and the Personal 
Identification Number (PIN). However, 
Bluetooth has a number of weaknesses 
which can be exploited by adversaries to 
obtain keys and the PIN numbers, 
depending on how session initialization of 
the communication standard is performed 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2002; Hager & 
Midkiff, 2003). 
Zigbee 
Zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4) is a wireless 
standard of data transmission allowing the 
communication of device to device with 
low cost as well as low data rates and low 
power consumption. It replaces wired 
solutions with low data rates requirements. 
Zigbee can operate at 2.4 GHz with a basic 
bit rate of 250Kbps. Zigbee is suited for 
house-oriented applications such as 
applications of Home Appliances, Lighting 
and Climate Control system as well as 
Home Security system (Ricquebourg et al., 
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2006; Adams, 2002; HGI, 2006; 
Delphinanto, 2003). 
Zigbee security is based on a centralized 
infrastructure providing a central control on security 
of the network. There is a centralized trust entity that 
is trusted by all nodes in the network and is 
responsible for distribution of keys and admission 
control of nodes requesting to access to the network. 
Each network can not have more than a single 
centralized trust entity and each device can be 
associated to only one centralized trust entity. 
However, this entity can be considered as a single 
point of failure and can be a security vulnerability of 
the network which can be exploited by malicious 
attackers. 
Furthermore, Zigbee standard proposes three 
types of keys; link key, network key and master key. 
Link key is shared between any two devices and is 
used to secure their communication. Network key is 
a common key for all devices and is shared among 
all devices in the network. Network key is used to 
secure all broadcast communications in the network. 
Master key is pre-installed or derives from the 
centralized trust entity and is used to generate the 
link keys. 
Additionally, Zigbee standard provides data 
freshness, data integrity, authentication and 
encryption. Data freshness is achieved using 
counters which are reset every time a new key is 
generated. Data integrity is provided by Message 
Authentication Codes. Network level authentication 
and device level authentication are provided using 
the common network key and the link keys 
respectively. Finally, Zigbee proposes 128-bit AES 
encryption using the common network key for 
network encryption and the link keys for device 
encryption (Baronti et al., 2007). 
HiperLAN 
HiperLAN is a wireless LAN standard 
published by European Telecommunications 
Standard Institute (ETSI). There are two 
versions; HiperLAN 1 and HiperLAN 2. 
HiperLAN 1 was published in 1996 and its 
maximum data rate is 23.5Mbps. HiperLAN 2 
was published in 2000 and can handle up to 
54Mbps data rate. The basic services that two 
versions can support are data, audio and video 
transmission (Zahariadis, 2003; Delphinanto et 
al., 2003). 
HiperLAN uses schemas for mutual 
authentication of mobile devices, encryption of 
data and exchange of encryption keys. 
HiperLAN standard proposes five 
authentication mechanisms based on the 
challenge response approach providing mutual 
authentication between mobile devices and the 
access point. Furthermore, HiperLAN uses the 
DES and 3DES algorithms for data encryption. 
Finally, the exchange of encryption keys is 
based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol. In spite 
the fact that HiperLAN has several relatively 
strong security mechanisms, there are a lot of 
vulnerabilities (Casole, 2002). 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
IN SMART HOME 
Having presented the concept of a Smart Home 
and described the networking technologies 
used to implement its systems, the security 
requirements for a Smart Home environment 
are identified. The main security objectives that 
a Smart Home environment must fulfil are 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, 
Authorization, Non-repudiation and 
Availability (Jeong et al., 2006; Herzog et al., 
2001; Kim et al., 2007; Schwiderski-Grosche et 
al., 2004; Kangas, 2002; He, 2002; Bergstrom 
et al., 2001; Komninos et al., 2007c). 
Confidentiality is concerned with 
preventing unauthorized access to certain 
information. In an attack at confidentiality, an 
adversary may use services providing 
information about the Smart Home’s status in 
order to enable indirect surveillance of 
resident’s activities in a Smart Home 
environment (Komninos et al., 2007a; He, 
2002; Bergstrom et al., 2001; Komninos et al., 
2007c; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Confidentiality can be achieved using 
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symmetric cryptographic ciphers (i.e. block or 
stream ciphers). 
Integrity is a security service that provides 
prevention of unauthorized modification of 
information. Integrity ensures that data have not 
been changed, destroyed or lost during any 
process, such as transfer, storage or retrieval. In 
other words, Integrity ensures that data are 
consistent and correct. Integrity can be 
compromised by a malicious attacker who 
eavesdrops on the traffic to or from the internal 
network of a Smart Home and tampers data. 
Integrity can be provided using a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) (Herzog et al., 
2001; Bergstrom et al., 2001; Komninos et al., 
2007c; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Authentication is a security service related to 
verification of an entity based on a password or a 
shared secret key between the communicating 
parties. Authentication allows one entity to verify 
the identity of another entity. There are two types 
of authentication; entity authentication and 
message authentication. Entity authentication 
verifies the validity of the claimed identity of 
each entity. In other words, entity authentication 
confirms the identities of communicating parties. 
On the other hand, message authentication 
verifies that a message derives from the claimed 
entity. In a Smart Home environment, a lot of 
authentication mechanisms are required for user-
to-device, userto-internal network, device-to-
device, deviceto-internal network and user-to-
service provider authentications. An adversary 
may pretend to be another legitimate user or 
entity in order to obtain critical information 
regarding home users or access Smart Home 
environment services (Jeong et al., 2006; 
Komninos et al., 2007a; SchwiderskiGrosche et 
al., 2004; Bergstrom et al., 2001; Komninos et 
al., 2007c; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002; 
Komninos & Mantas, 2009). 
Authorization is the process that 
determines the user’s access rights on a 
device or a network resource and what a 
device is allowed to do within the Smart 
Home environment. Authorization can also 
provide different access levels to guarantee 
that entities can only access and perform 
operations on network resources that they 
are authorized for. The devices of the Smart 
Home internal network can be categorized 
into two types; home devices and foreign 
devices. Regarding the home devices, the 
authorization mechanism is based on home 
user’s access rights on the devices. 
Regarding foreign devices, the owner of 
each device delegates certain access rights 
to foreign users who have to pay when they 
wish to use them. However, an adversary 
can use forged authorizations to perform 
prohibited actions in a Smart Home 
environment (Schwiderski-Grosche et al., 
2004; Bergstrom et al., 2001; Komninos et 
al., 2007c; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Non-repudiation corresponds to a 
security service providing protection 
against denial of involvement in an action. 
For instance, Nonrepudiation prevents both 
sender and receiver from denying of a 
transmitted message or access to services. 
This service is similar to a signature by the 
author or recipient of a document in real 
life. Furthermore, this service can not 
prevent an entity from repudiating having 
performed a particular action. However, it 
can provide proof (i.e. proof of 
commitment, resource use, obligation, data 
origin) that can be stored and used later by 
a trusted third party in order to resolve 
disputes that arise in cases that an action is 
repudiated by one of the entities 
participated in the action. Non-repudiation 
can be provided using digital signatures 
based on public key encryption 
cryptosystems (Schwiderski-Grosche et al., 
2004; He, 2002; Komninos et al., 2007c; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2002; Stallings, 
2005). 
Availability ensures that network 
services and resources (i.e. bandwidth) are 
available and protected against events 
impacting the network such as malicious 
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attacks. Especially, the Smart Home 
internal network is exposed to direct denial 
of service attacks, since it is exposed to 
Internet directly. What is more, disaster 
recovery solutions are included in this 
service since the internal network is 
exposed to a variety of attacks that lead to 
the loss or reduction of availability (He, 
2002; Komninos et al., 2007c; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2002;). 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
SECURITY IN SMART HOME 
Security is a crucial and critical issue in a Smart 
Home environment. Many home users are concerned 
about unauthorized access into their home and about 
privacy of their data. However, it is not a trivial task 
to provide security in the Smart Home environment 
because of its heterogeneous nature, dynamic nature, 
the fact that it is always connected to Internet as well 
as the open security back doors derived from the 
household members (Jeong et al., 2006; Herzog et 
al., 2001; Thomas & Sandhu, 2004; Wang et al., 
2005; Haque & Ahamed 2006; Schwiderski-Grosche 
et al., 2004; He, 2002; Ziegler, Mueller, Schaefer, & 
Loeser, 2005). 
Smart Home internal network is an extremely 
heterogeneous network since it consists of a vast 
range of different devices, applications and 
communication technologies as we have already 
described. In a Smart Home, there are many devices 
such as light switches, white appliances, sensors, 
cameras, TVs, phones, PCs, and PDAs, with very 
different capabilities and requirements, and 
communicate with each other via wired and wireless 
networks (Wang et al., 2005; Schwiderski-Grosche 
et al., 2004; Ziegler et al., 2005). Consequently, the 
deployment of security mechanisms depends on the 
device capabilities and requirements. The 
capabilities of devices vary widely in terms of 
memory storage, battery power and computational 
capability (Haque & Ahamed 2006; Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2002). There are devices such as PCs that can 
easily handle complex computations and support 
security features. However, there are devices such as 
the handset of a cordless phone that they do not have 
the appropriate computational power because of their 
limited resources (i.e. memory storage, battery 
power and computational capability). These devices 
usually provide no protection or they may able to 
support only simple security mechanisms 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). Thus, exploiting these 
devices, intruders can compromise residential 
networks. Furthermore, not all devices require the 
same level of security. It can vary from low level to 
high level. Different security mechanisms should be 
implemented depending on the requirements of each 
device. 
Moreover, the applications supported of 
Smart Home Systems are also diverse. There 
are applications that support different types of 
data such as audio, video signals and low date 
rate sensor information, with different features. 
Thus, each application has security schemes 
that should be optimal for it. Applications that 
support high data rate services (e.g. multimedia 
applications) require security mechanisms that 
do not increase delay or jitter. On the other 
hand, applications that support low data rate 
services (e.g. over a sensor network) can be 
constrained to use complex security schemes 
because of power consumption (Haque & 
Ahamed 2006; Schwiderski-Grosche et al., 
2004; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Additionally, having presented the Smart 
Home networking technology in section “Smart 
Home Networking Technology”, it is clear that 
the internal network of a Smart Home is a 
completely heterogeneous network which 
integrates a number of different communication 
technologies. Each of Smart Home networking 
technologies has its own features and security 
weaknesses. For instance, wireless 
technologies can be easily tapped because of 
their broadcast nature. An attacker can intercept 
the signal or disturb the normal operation of a 
wireless communication.  
On the other hand, wired technologies provide higher 
levels of security inherently. 
Security in Smart Home Environment 
183 
In a Smart Home environment, there are also 
a lot of wireless devices, supporting a wide range 
of services, which join and leave the internal 
network completely arbitrarily, forming an 
extremely volatile ad hoc subnetwork. This ad 
hoc subnetwork is extremely dynamic and 
changes from time to time. Thus, the topology of 
the internal network is dynamic, which means 
that the required security mechanisms should be 
reconfigured dynamically every time that the 
topology is changed without home user’s 
intervention (Thomas & Sandhu, 2004; Wang et 
al., 2005; Haque & Ahamed 2006; Schwiderski-
Grosche et al., 2004; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Otherwise, the internal network suffers from 
several security vulnerabilities. However, the 
deployment of security mechanisms in an ad hoc 
network is a challenging issue because of its 
inherent dynamic nature. Thus, the security 
solutions regarding the ad hoc networking should 
be based on dynamic security mechanisms with 
sufficient intelligence in order to prevent security 
breaches. 
Additionally, the expansion of the Smart 
Home internal network to the outside world via 
Internet creates many network security problems, 
as it is exposed to a variety of cyber attacks such 
as DoS attacks, malicious software, 
eavesdropping and so on (Jeong et al, 2006; 
Herzog et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2007; Kangas, 
2002; Bergstrom et al., 2001). In contrast to dial 
up connections to Internet, Smart Home high-
speed connections provide constant connectivity 
to Internet, which implies static IP address. The 
fact that the IP address does not change makes 
the internal network to be easily hacked, since 
attackers have a lot of time to guess the IP 
address and hack the connected devices (Herzog 
et al., 2001). Moreover, the internal network is 
subjected to all legacy security attacks of an open 
network since it is accessible from Internet. 
First of all, malicious attackers can cause 
havoc in a Smart Home environment as they can 
intercept and modify remotely transmitted 
messages of networks (i.e. Powerline network, 
Phoneline network, wireless networks) that 
comprise the internal network of the Smart 
Home. Furthermore, malicious attackers might 
compromise the internal network and use it to 
launch attacks against other networks covering 
their tracks. Adversaries can also use the 
computing power and the resources of the 
compromised internal network for Denial of 
Service attacks against other Internet nodes. 
Furthermore, adversaries might gain access over 
Internet to confidential information of the 
household members eavesdropping on their 
Internet traffic. For example, sniffing messages 
of e-banking transactions, adversaries can get 
credit card numbers or they can learn about the 
behavior of the household members. Also, they 
can get the locking mechanism password of the 
home in order to burglarize it (Herzog et al., 
2001; Bergstrom et al., 2001). 
Thus, due to the heterogeneity of 
devices, applications and communication 
technologies in a Smart Home 
environment, the dynamic nature of the 
Smart Home internal network as well as the 
fast permanent connection to the outside 
world, there is not a single security solution 
that is able to provide all required security 
services in order to decrease the risk of 
security attacks. Consequently, the 
challenges for security insurance can be 
addressed with a diversity of security 
mechanisms, protocols and services that 
should be integrated and managed in the 
Smart Home internal network. 
Finally, the household members are 
another factor that makes a Smart Home 
environment vulnerable to a rich variety of 
security threats. Most of the household 
members are usually nonprofessionals in 
networking as well as network security 
field. However, they usually build the 
internal network without participation of 
security professionals. Thus, there are 
always security weaknesses in the internal 
network which can be exploited by 
intruders. Additionally, household 
members often abuse their privileges 
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raising many security issues. Furthermore, 
in many cases, home users consider that the 
appropriate security measures are 
complicated and they are not willing to 
follow them because of low usability. 
Besides, there are cases that residents do 
not use security protection or follow 
security policies because either they do not 
care about security or they are not able to 
understand completely the threats that they 
are faced with (Thomas & Sandhu, 2004; 
Wang et al., 2005; He, 2002). 
SECURITY THREATS IN 
SMART HOME 
Smart Home security threats can be derived from the 
factors described in section “Factors Affecting the 
Security in Smart Home” and they usually attempt to 
compromise one or more of the security 
requirements for a Smart Home environment 
presented in section “Security Requirements in 
Smart Home”. These threats are mainly classified 
into internal and external threats. 
Internal Threats 
Internal threats stem from within the trusted Smart 
Home internal network. However, they are not given 
the attention they deserve compared with external 
attacks. Internal threats can be derived from 
inappropriate network construction and 
configuration, incomplete security plan and software 
pitfalls. 
Inappropriate Smart Home internal network 
construction and configuration of network enabled 
devices create many security breaches in a Smart 
Home environment. It is very important the 
professional design and implementation of the 
internal network. Additionally, it is a very critical 
issue the correct configuration and set up of network 
devices (e.g. servers), user devices (laptops, PDAs) 
and firewalls. Otherwise, a wrongly configured 
device can raise security risks. However, for a 
nonprofessional home user, the correct construction 
and configuration can be an extremely difficult and 
daunting task. 
Furthermore, there are not complete security 
policies in a Smart Home environment. Any 
home user (young children, people lacking 
security skills) is allowed to use any device and 
access any service. Besides, any resident can 
change the Smart Home internal network since 
he\she can modify the configuration of network 
equipment, add or remove network devices 
from the internal network as well as install or 
uninstall software of network devices. 
Additionally, the security features of the Smart 
Home environment can be modified 
intentionally or unintentionally by any home 
user. Also, there are cases that the home users 
abuse their privileges (e.g. frequently changing 
systems’ settings, downloading uncertified 
software). Thus, a lot of security holes for 
intruders can be raised when the home user does 
not follow security policies properly. Finally, 
another fact that poses many security threats to 
the internal network is the use of software with 
security pitfalls (Wang et al., 2005; He, 2002). 
External Threats 
Smart Home internal network is subject to a lot 
of security threats derived from outside 
malicious nodes. The types of the external 
threats are classified based on the way the 
information is compromised. There are two 
generic types of threats: passive and active 
attacks. 
In passive attacks, the intruder intends to 
gain unauthorized access to information that is 
being transmitted without modifying it. The 
detection of passive attacks in a communication 
is not easy, since the intruder does not change 
the messages that are being exchanged between 
the sender and the receiver. Passive attacks can 
be either eavesdropping or traffic analysis (He, 
2002; Komninos et al., 2007c, Stallings, 2005). 
These two passive attacks are described below. 
Eavesdropping allows an intruder to 
monitor the home user traffic (e.g. telephone 
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conversation, email message) between the 
Smart Home internal network and the outside 
world without the consent of the 
communicating parties. This traffic may 
contain confidential information that the 
residents do not want to disclosure it to 
unauthorized third parties. Eavesdropping is the 
most widely identified security problem in open 
networks and is an attack on confidentiality of 
the Smart Home internal network. 
Traffic analysis is a subtler passive attack as 
it allows an adversary to deduce information 
observing the traffic pattern of a communication 
that is taking place between one communicating 
party located in the Smart Home environment 
and one located in the outside world. Using 
traffic analysis, the adversary is able to infer 
sensitive information (e.g. home user’s location, 
passwords) from the messages that are being 
exchanged even when they are encrypted and 
they can not be decrypted. In traffic analysis 
attack, the greater the number of observed 
messages, the more information can be extracted. 
In active attacks, the adversary intends to 
tamper the information or generate fraudulent 
data into the Smart Home internal network. 
Active attacks can result in severe losses for the 
home users. The main types of active attacks are 
masquerading, replay, message modification, 
denial of service and malicious codes (He, 2002; 
Komninos et al., 2007c, Stallings, 2005). 
In masquerading attack, an intruder gains 
certain unauthorized privileges pretending to be 
another legitimate user or entity. The intruder 
may impersonate an authorized home user or 
entity and access to the Smart Home internal 
network remotely in order to get sensitive 
information or obtain services. This attack is 
often combined with others attacks such as replay 
attack. 
In replay attack, an adversary firstly obtains 
messages that are being exchanged between two 
legitimate communicating parties and retransmit 
them later as an authorized entity. The adversary 
may capture a copy of a valid service request sent 
from a device in the Smart Home environment, 
store it and then replay it in order to access the 
service that the home user is authorized to. 
Message modification takes place when 
an unauthorized entity modifies contents of 
a legitimate message by deleting, adding to, 
or changing it. Furthermore, in this attack, 
an adversary can also create delays to some 
messages or change their order producing 
unauthorized effect. Message modification 
can take place when an adversary intents to 
hijack the communication between two 
authorized entities, alter a software so that 
it performs maliciously or change values in 
a data file. This attack can result in a DoS 
attack and is an attack on integrity. 
Denial of service attack is used in cases 
that an adversary intents to make a network 
unavailable to users or reduce the 
availability of network services. The 
adversary can send countless messages to 
the Smart Home internal network in order 
to overload its resources with traffic. Thus 
the authorized users are not able to access 
the services of the home network. 
Additionally, the adversary can send a 
tremendous amount of messages to servers 
and devices connected to Internet so as to 
block the internal traffic transmitted via 
wired or wireless networks inside the Smart 
Home. 
Malicious codes are software threats 
that cause adverse affects to the Smart 
Home internal network exploiting its 
vulnerabilities. Malicious codes are used to 
modify, destroy or steal data as well as 
allow unauthorized access. Malicious 
codes can be classified into two categories. 
The first category includes those (i.e. Trap 
doors, viruses, logic bombs and Trojan 
horses) that need a host program. They are 
parts of programs that can not exist 
independently of some actual application 
software. The second category consists of 
those (i.e. worms and zombies) that are 
self-contained programs and can be 
scheduled and run by the operating system. 
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Furthermore, malicious codes can be 
categorized on those that do not replicate 
and those that do. The former are parts of 
programs that are to be activated when the 
host program is invoked in order to perform 
a specific function. The latter contains parts 
of programs or independent programs that 
when they are executed they produce one or 
more copies of themselves in order to be 
activated later on the same system or 
another system. 
Each of the malicious code has different threat to 
network security as they have their own 
characteristics. Malicious codes are distributed 
combining network communication and multiple 
attacking methods. They are distributed via emails, 
web pages, instant communication tools, software 
pitfalls, etc. The security threats of malicious codes 
have the highest risk in a Smart Home environment 
compared to corporation networks due to lack of 
home user’s awareness about network security and 
data protection. 
SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
SMART HOMES 
The most essential security technologies for making 
a Smart Home internal network secure are 
authentication and authorization mechanisms. Both 
mechanisms are required in order to restrict any 
malicious entity from accessing the Smart Home 
internal network. Furthermore, use of firewalls is 
another intrusion prevention mechanism that is 
important to increase security in Smart Home 
environment. However, intrusion prevention 
mechanisms alone are not sufficient for the Smart 
Home internal network because of its complexity 
and heterogeneity. Therefore, the use of intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) is also required. 
Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication process includes entity authentication 
and message authentication. Entity authentication 
ensures the authenticity of the entity and message 
authentication verifies that the received message 
derives from the right sender. There are mechanisms 
for entity authentication as well as message 
authentication. 
Entity authentication mechanisms support two 
processes; identification process and verification 
process. In identification process, an entity (e.g. 
home user) requests access to a network claiming a 
certain identity based on an identifier. The 
verification process is based on three approaches; 
proof by knowledge, proof by possession and proof 
by property (Kim et al., 2007; Kangas, 2002; 
Komninos & Mantas, 2008, 2009). 
The proof by knowledge approach takes into 
consideration what the user knows. This 
approach usually checks a secret password or 
an identifier (ID) of the user that request access. 
The authentication mechanisms based on this 
approach called ID-password-based 
authentication mechanisms. The proof by 
possession approach depends on what the user 
possesses. This approach is based on the 
ownership of a smart card that should be 
connected during the login process. The 
authentication mechanisms that follow this 
approach called smart card-based 
authentication mechanisms. The proof by 
property approach is based on what the user is. 
In this approach, the verifier measures certain 
biometrics properties (e.g. fingerprint, iris, 
retina) of the user. The authentication 
mechanisms based on this approach called 
biometric-based authentication mechanisms. 
Additionally, the entity authentication 
mechanisms can be divided into two categories; 
authentication mechanisms for intra-domain, 
and authentication mechanisms for inter-
domain (Kim et al., 2007). In contrast to Intra-
domain authentication mechanisms taking 
place in the Smart Home environment, inter-
domain authentication mechanisms are applied 
out of the Smart Home environment. 
Authentication mechanisms for intra-domain 
include the authentication mechanisms based 
on proof by knowledge, proof by possession 
and proof by property approaches. 
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However, authentication mechanisms for 
interdomain include the authentication 
mechanisms based on proof by knowledge and 
proof by possession approaches. Authentication 
mechanisms using biometric information are 
not used for inter domain authentication. It 
happens because once biometric information is 
disclosed to malicious attackers the user can not 
exchange the exposed biometric information 
for new one as the modification of human body 
is very difficult. Thus, it results in serious 
privacy violation in cases that biometric 
information is revealed. Consequently, it is not 
logical to use biometric-based authentication 
mechanisms in applications that require 
biometric information to be transferred over 
Internet (Kim et al., 2007; Yun-kyung, Hong-il, 
& Hyung-kyu, 2006). 
Message authentication mechanisms are 
achieved using public key cryptosystems and 
digital signatures (Kangas, 2002). In public key 
cryptosystems, each communicating party has a 
pair of keys. One is used for encryption and the 
other for decryption. The key used for encryption 
is known to everyone and is referred to as public 
key. On the other hand, the key used for 
decryption remains secret and is known as 
private key. The private key and the public key 
are related mathematically. But, the private key 
can not be derived from the public key in a 
reasonable amount of time. In public key 
cryptosystems, the sender encrypts a message 
with the recipient’s public key and only the entity 
(i.e. recipient) with the corresponding private key 
can decrypt the encrypted message (Stallings, 
2005). Furthermore, digital signatures are used in 
public key cryptosystems. Digital signatures are 
produced using sender’s private key. A message 
signed with sender’s private key can be verified 
by the entity that knows the sender’s public key. 
In a Smart Home Environment, the 
authentication mechanism challenges the home 
user to provide his unique information (e.g. 
password, smartcard, fingerprint). If the 
authentication mechanism can verify that the 
shared secret was presented correctly, the home 
user is authenticated directly. Furthermore, a 
home user is required to be authenticated only 
one time to access any network resource or 
service. If the authentication does not succeed, 
this leads to rejection or termination of the access 
and the creation of a report to a security 
management center. Furthermore, there are cases 
that the home user desires to access a remote 
application server which performs its own 
authentication. In these cases, the user is 
identified by the residential gateway and it does 
the required authentication with the remote 
server instead of the user. It is happens because 
the residential gateway has an authentication 
mapping function, which achieves mapping 
between authentication mechanisms for intra-
domain and authentication mechanisms for inter-
domain (Kim et al., 2007). 
Authorization Mechanisms 
The purpose of authorization is to control 
the authenticated entity’s access rights on 
network services and resources. 
Additionally, authorization contributes to 
reduce the harmful consequences of 
exposure to malicious accesses. Thus, 
authorization mechanisms are used to 
determine what level of access a particular 
authenticated entity should have on 
network services and resources in a Smart 
Home environment. For authorization 
within the Smart Home internal network, 
the existing authorization mechanisms can 
be used. The existing authorization 
mechanisms can be classified into three 
categories; server-based authorization 
mechanisms, peer-to-peer authorization 
mechanisms and certificate-based 
authorization mechanisms (Kim et al., 
2007; Kangas, 2002). 
Server-based authorization mechanisms 
are used in client-server communication 
model. In this mechanism, the server 
generates and keeps authorization rules. 
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Server-based authorization mechanism is 
the simplest authorization mechanism. 
Peer-to-peer authorization mechanisms 
are based on peer-to-peer communication 
service model. In this mechanism, a peer 
manages the authorization rules or requires 
help of a designated authorization server. 
This mechanism is more complicated than 
the server-based authorization mechanism 
because of a number of constraints such as 
database maintenance and hardware 
specifications of peer’s machine. 
Finally, certificate-based authorization 
mechanisms refer to authorization infrastructures, 
where Authorization Certificates (ACs) are used for 
authentication and access control simultaneously. 
AC establishes authorization access rights between a 
subject and a resource (Kim et al., 2007; Kangas, 
2002; Stallings, 2005). 
All the above three categories of authorization 
mechanisms use an Access Control List (ACL) 
schema or a Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
schema. Access Control List (ACL) schema includes 
a list of permissions attached to an object. ACL 
establishes relationships between subjects (i.e. 
entities) and objects (i.e. resources). ACL determines 
the entity allowed to access the object and what 
operations are allowed to be performed on the object. 
ACL schema defines access rights of entities to the 
resources in terms of write, read and execute 
permissions. First of all, when an entity requests to 
perform an operation on an object, the list is checked 
in order to decide whether to proceed with the 
operation or not. ACL schema includes two models; 
discretionary and mandatory. In discretionary access 
control model, the owner of an object is able to have 
full control access to the object. In mandatory access 
control model, the authorization mechanism enforces 
restrictions that override the permissions stated in the 
ACL. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schema is 
a newer alternative approach to discretionary access 
control model and mandatory access control model. 
In Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schema, an 
intermediate component, called role, is used between 
a subject and a resource (Kim et al., 2007; Kangas, 
2002; Stallings, 2005). Intrusion Prevention: 
Firewalls 
A firewall is a hardware device or software running 
on another device which inspects the information 
passing through it in order to prevent unauthorized 
Internet entities from accessing private networks 
connected to Internet. A firewall examines all 
network traffic entering or leaving the private 
network and blocks the network traffic that does not 
conform to a defined set of rules based on security 
criteria (Stallings, 2005; HGI, 2006). 
The firewall techniques used in order to 
control the network traffic are packet filtering, 
proxy service and stateful inspection. In packet 
filtering method, firewall analyzes packets, 
entering or leaving the private network, against 
a set of filters and accepts or discards them 
based on user-defined rules. Firewall provides 
a private network with the capability to perform 
coarse-grain filtering on IP and TCP/UDP 
headers, including IP addresses, port numbers 
and acknowledgment bits. However, in this 
method it is difficult for the user to configure 
the firewall. Furthermore, this method is 
vulnerable to IP spoofing attack. 
In proxy service method, firewall retrieves 
all information entering and leaving the private 
network and then sends it to the requesting 
entities. Thus, firewall hides the true IP 
addresses of the private networks devices from 
malicious adversaries. 
In stateful inspection method, firewall 
monitors the state of network connections (i.e. 
TCP, UDP) passing across it and stores 
information (i.e. IP addresses, ports sequence 
numbers, etc.) about them in a state table. Thus, 
filtering decisions are based on the information 
that has been stored based on the prior packets 
that have passed through the firewall. Firewall 
is able to distinguish legitimate packets for 
different types of connections. Thus, only 
packets matching a known connection state are 
accepted by the firewall. However, firewalls 
that follow the stateful inspection technique are 
not very efficient for applications that include 
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IP addresses and TCP/UDP port information in 
the payload. To have higher level of security, 
firewalls should combine packet filtering with 
application gateways. Application gateways 
recognize the specific packets and analyze their 
payloads in order to obtain the required 
information and make policy decisions 
(Stallings, 2005; HGI, 2006). 
All the above firewall techniques are not 
competitors. A Smart Home environment can 
employ all of them together to provide defence 
in depth. As we have already discussed in 
section “Smart Home Concept”, the residential 
gateway is the official access point to the Smart 
Home internal network. All traffic transmitted 
from Internet to the internal network or to 
Internet from the internal network passes 
through the residential gateway. Thus, a 
firewall can be installed on the residential 
gateway in order to block all unauthorized 
accesses or suspicious data. The installed 
firewall monitors and analyzes all traffic 
between the internal network and Internet to 
decide whether it corresponds to the criteria of 
the Smart Home security policy. 
Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection is used as a second line of 
defence to protect the Smart Home internal 
network because once an intrusion is detected, a 
response can then take place to minimize 
damages. In case that an intruder succeeds in his 
attack over the Smart Home internal network, 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) can detect this 
attack and stop the activities of the intruder. In 
the Smart Home internal network, both Network-
based IDS and host-based IDS can be used. 
Network-based IDS are used in wired networks 
where traffic monitoring takes place at switches, 
routers and gateways. However, host-based IDS 
are used in ad hoc networks where there are not 
such traffic concentration points. Host-based 
IDS are concerned with what is happening on 
each individual node of the ad hoc network 
(Komninos, Vergados, & Douligeris, 2007b; 
Komninos & Douligeris, 2009). 
Intrusion detection techniques are classified 
into two categories; misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. Misuse detection technique 
requires audit data for analysis and compares 
these data to already known attack patterns stored 
in large databases. In cases that any comparison 
between the audit data and the known attack 
patterns results in a match, an intrusion alarm is 
set. The main advantage of misuse detection 
technique is the fact that it can accurately and 
efficiently detect instances of known attacks. 
However, this technique is not able to detect the 
newly invented attacks. 
On the other hand, anomaly detection 
technique is based on statistical behaviour. 
Anomaly detectors look for behaviour that 
deviates from normal network activity. 
First of all, this technique requires the 
collection of audit data for analysis. Then, 
the audit data is transformed to a format 
statistically comparable to the profile of a 
user generated dynamically and updated 
based on the user’s usage. In cases that any 
comparison between the audit data and the 
user’s profile results in a deviation that 
crosses a set threshold, then an intrusion 
alarm is activated. The main advantage of 
anomaly detection technique is that it can 
detect unknown or new intrusion without 
requiring prior knowledge of the intrusion. 
The main disadvantage of this technique is 
that it may not be able to describe what the 
attack is (Stallings, 2005; Komninos & 
Douligeris, 2009). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we have presented the 
concept of the Smart Home itself as well as 
its systems and the used networking 
technologies in order to perceive the 
security issues of Smart Homes. However, 
Smart Home security is of extreme 
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importance since it affects the privacy of 
the household members. Thus, a variety of 
important security issues in Smart Home 
environments were discussed. Especially, 
the security objectives of a Smart Home as 
well as the main factors that increase the 
level of difficulty to provide security in a 
Smart Home environment were described. 
Furthermore, the threats that intend to 
compromise the security requirements 
were examined. Finally, existing security 
mechanisms that provide security features 
in a Smart Home environment were 
presented. 
In a lot of cases, most of the home users 
are not security-aware enough to realize the 
implications of Smart Home environments. 
However, the importance of Smart Home 
security is going to be raised in the future 
because of the increasing complexity and 
heterogeneity of the Smart Home internal 
networks and the increasing use of remote 
working habits of the home users. Thus, 
there are requirements that should take 
place in order to reduce the risks of security 
attacks in a Smart Home environment. First 
of all, the main requirements for ensuring 
security in a Smart Home environment are 
the correct network design and construction 
as well as the correct configuration of 
network devices (e.g. firewalls, servers 
etc.) by professionals in networking and 
network security. Furthermore, operating 
systems and application software should be 
installed or configured correctly. 
Moreover, the correct creation of complete 
security policies is obligated. Security 
policies specify the home user’s privileges 
and responsibilities. Additionally, user’s 
privileges should be restricted to avoid 
security breaches. Finally, the correct 
installation and use of a reliable virus 
defense system is required. 
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